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Presenting the case against tax reform .. at first seems like making a
case against democracy and justice.

Nonetheless, there are sound and

compelling reasons to oppose the current rush to revise the Internal Revenue
Code.
The Treasury's Proposals
11

The staff of the Treasury Department has proposed a modified flat tax,

11

an academic economist's dream-- an ideal tax structure for the long run.
This new system would lower income tax rates, reduce the number of brackets,
and curtail or eliminate many of the special provisions that have been added
to the Internal Revenue Code over the years.

These changes sound so good that

it seems difficult for anyone to quarrel with them.

Yet given the serious

effects of these proposals, a more cautious approach is warranted.
Upon examining the specific details of the Treasury Department's tax
reform proposals, it appears that these changes are tantamount to taking a few
steps forward, only to end up taking even more steps backward.

The following

are four sets of these pluses and minuses:
1.

Income tax rates would be lowered.

The top bracket would decline

from 50 percent to 35 percent, but the plan would eliminate

Note:

Dr. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American
Business at Washington University in St. Louis. The views expressed
are personal.
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preferential treatment of capital gains, and limit the tax
deductibility of travel and entertainment.
2.

The personal deduction would be raised to $2,000, but itemized
deductions of charitable contributions would be limited to the amount
over 2 percent of adjusted gross income.

For those taxpayers who

do not itemize, there would no longer be a special deduction.

Also,

the deduction of state and local taxes would be terminated.
3.

Depreciation allowances would be protected from inflation, but the
faster write-offs authorized in 1981 would be removed altogether.
Furthermore, the Treasury would eliminate the investment tax credit.

4.

Allowable deductions for worker and spouse IRAs would be raised to
$2500 a year each, but deductions for mortgage interest would be
restricted to the taxpayer's principal residence.

In addition, only

$5,000 of other personal interest payments would be tax deductible.
Not every speci a 1 pro vision in the tax code would be e 1imina ted or even
modified.

Six key items would not be changed at all.

Under the Treasury's

plan, the deduction for medical expenses above 5 percent of adjusted gross
income, tax deferral of corporate pensions, taxation of Social Security
benefits, tax exemption of public-purpose municipal bonds, indexing of
personal income tax brackets and personal exemptions, and preferential
treatment of capital gains on owner-occupied housing would all be retained.
Some Initial Impacts
In sum, these changes would reduce the overall tax burden on individuals
and families by about 7 percent, while increasing corporate tax bills by
approximately 30 percent . . This result may appear politically attractive, but
in terms of elementary economics, the Treasury staff apparently ignored one of
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President Reagan's most basic and accurate statements:
taxes; it collects them.

Only people pay taxes.

business doesn't pay

Moreover, these changes

would transfer after-tax income from business firms who save and invest
heavily to consumers with much lower saving tendencies.
Of course, the advocates of the modified flat tax do not formally propose
to shift the tax burden from consumption to investment.

But reducing tax

rates and offsetting the substantial revenue loss by closing .. loopholes .. will
have this effect.

Apparently, the tax reformers overlooked the fact that

these .. loopholes .. have helped fuel the current economic expansion.

The irony

here is rich indeed; the same Treasury Department that urged Congress to enact
the Accelerated Capital Recovery System (ACRS) as tax reform in 1981 is now
selling the rescission of ACRS as tax reform in 1985.

What is less amusing,

hm·Jever, is that such .. reform .. is likely to reduce investment and economic
growth, thereby increasing unemployment.
Another problem area in the ambitious Treasury tax plan is the proposed
treatment of small business.

Eliminating .. progression .. in corporate tax

brackets may sound like tax simplification, but for a small incorporated
business with taxable income of $50,000 a year, the proposed 33 percent
standard rate would double its tax bill.

For a corporation with annual

taxable income of $100,000, its federal income tax would increase 28 percent.
Perhaps, in his review of the Treasury staff work, the new Secretary,
James Baker, will abandon changes with such undesirable results.
The proposal to eliminate the lower tax rate for capital gains would also
weaken the prospects for an expanding economy.
clear.

The record on this tax is

When the rate goes up, the pool of venture capital shrinks.

Conversely, when the capital gains rate is lowered, the supply of venture
capital grows rapidly --

and so does the economy.
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In 1969, Congress raised the top capital gains tax rate from 25 to 49
percent.

The impact of this hike was devastating; venture capitalists

commonly refer to the 1970s as the "Death Valley Days" of this critical
source of funds for formative enterprises.

In 1978, the rate was cut to 28

percent and the availabflity of venture capital soared.
1981 reinforced this trend.

The further cut in

The results are plain to see:

the rapid creation

of new companies and new jobs.
It is not surprising that new high-tech companies-- which rarely start
off with large accumulations of capital -- have been in the vanguard of
opposition to changing the current tax treatment of capital gains.
In an administration that has rightly advocated greater reliance on
voluntarism and private

sect~r

initiatives, the Treasury proposals for a basic

reduction in tax incentives for charitable contributions is a serious
contradiction.

Similarly, the same administration that has consistently (and

correctly) urged a shift in federal responsibilities to the state and local
level, is now proposing to eliminate the helpful deduction of state and local
taxes.
Since the average taxpayer contributes less than two percent of adjusted
gross income to charity, the great bulk of gifts to philanthropic institutions
would no longer be tax deductible. In addition, the proposal to eliminate the
deductions of charitable contributions for those taxpayers who do not itemize
would have a similar effect, since two out of three taxpayers do not itemize.
The result would not be the end of voluntary giving.

But, at the margin,

we would expect taxpayers to make fewer gifts to many types of non-profit
organizations.

Professor Charles Clotfelter of Duke University projects that

charitable giving would decline by 20 percent under the Treasury proposal.

He
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also estimates that contributions by high-income taxpayers would decline
substantially, which would eventually lead to a decrease in charitable
endowments, arguably the most valuable type of contribution.
These items are just a sampler; it seems that the Treasury•s tax
proposals constitute an ill-considered assortment.

What is most

disconcerting, however, is the myopic vision of the Treasury staff.

When you

ask the plan•s architects how much attention was given to the effects of their
ambitious package on growth and investment, the response is, incredibly, that
they have not gotten around to it yet.
Apparently, the Treasury reformers were primarily concerned with
designing a paragon, a peerless new tax system for the long run.

Academics in

general, and economists in particular, are often criticized for being wedded
to idealized models and notions.

This is a valid criticism of the Treasury

staff, whose plan is nearly oblivious to so many of the practical problems
including the arbitrary distribution of windfall gains and losses-- that
would arise during the transition from the status quo to their new

11

ideal.
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The Case for Tax Loopholes
Because most of the revenue raised under the Treasury proposal is in the
form of closing

11

loopholes, .. some attention to the true nature of that

pejorative term is warranted.
Contrary to popular belief, most of these special provisions do not
result from an ingenious accountant•s deft manipulation of the Internal
Revenue Code•s arcane minutia.

Rather, the typical loophole was deliberately

placed there by Congress to achieve some important national objective.

The

really big revenue losses among the special provisions are items which the
average taxpayer never thinks of as a loophole; they result from such everyday
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activities as working and owning a home.

Some of the most highly publicized

loopholes, in contrast, involve significant but more modest revenue losses.
Examples include tax exemption of interest on state and local bonds and
shelters for certain types of real estate income.
The largest loophole
11

ben~fits

11

results from excluding employer-paid fringe

from taxable income.

Simply not having to declare the value of

company-financed pensions, health insurance, and similar benefits costs the
federal Treasury $79 billion a year in lost revenues.

Being able to deduct

mortgage interest, and property and other state and local taxes, reduces
federal revenues by $66 billion annually.

The deductibility of charitable

contributions and personal interest payments also results in a substantial
revenue 1oss.
Other important special tax provisions provide incentives for saving and
investment.
growth -allowances.

r~1any

corporate

11

loopholes

11

have been created to promote economic

notably the investment tax credit and liberalized depreciation
Individual investment is encouraged by lower tax rates on capital

gains.
Because tax reformers have ignored the justifications for many of these
special provisions, it is appropriate to consider why these
currently in the tax code.

11

11

loopholes are

In many instances, these tax breaks foster private

sector alternatives in areas where the public sector would otherwise attempt
to provide services.

For example, most of the fringe benefits provided by

employers are substitutes for direct government operation of social programs.
Private insurance in lieu of national health insurance is perhaps the most
obvious case in point.
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Simi 1arly, the incentives for home ownership are important factors in
enhancing family and neighborhood stability.

In contrast, direct federal

involvement in housing has been a dismal failure.

The deductibility of state

and local taxes is, in effect, a basic .. revenue sharing .. effort by the federal
government, where the shares are determined by state rather than federal
actions.
The special treatment of capital gains, the investment credit, and
liberalized depreciation allowances are strongly justified by the need to
promote investment and achieve a growing economy.

Arguments for reducing

these business .. subsidies .. would be more compelling if the Treasury were not
competing so vigorously with the private sector for the limited supply of
savings.

Existing investment incentives enhance the ability of

capital-intensive enterprises (agricultural and industrial) to finance capital
formation out of internal cash flow.

Thus, the tax incentives are an

important ingredient for economic growth.
There are many reasons for the tax deductibility of charitable
contributions.

Voluntary, private institutions provide important diversity

and choice in a free society.

They often take on responsibilities which

otherwise would be financed entirely by government revenues.

Besides being

considerably more expensive, those alternative government-sponsored programs
are often less effective since they tend to ignore market forces and
individual incentives.
From the viewpoint of determining the desirability of maintaining any
specific tax incentive, we should compare the costs and benefits of various
ways of achieving public policy objectives.

In many cases, tax incentives are

a more desirable and more economical alternative than direct federal outlays
because they focus on the private sector to achieve national objectives.

In
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other cases, just letting the market work provides the most attractive
approach.

There is no need to take a doctrinaire attitude and prohibit public

policy from using any of these alternatives.

The advantages and disadvantages

of each mechanism should be weighed, and the most desirable one used to
achieve a specific objective, be it the encouragement of business investment
or the discouragement of environmental pollution.
The Intitial Business Response
The current discussion about tax reform has succeeded in scaring business
executives and investors all over the country.
surprise.

This should come as no

A 1985 overhaul of the federal tax system would represent the

fourth major change in five years.

This will be destabilizing, especially

since, in another year or two, we can expect a fifth tax bill to correct the
many technical errors that will invariably result from any hastily enacted
revision of the complicated federal tax structure.
Under the circumstances, taxpayers should keep a few basic points in
mind.

First of all, the established tradition in federal revenue legislation

is that the changes are not retroactive.
tradition will continue.

There is no guarantee that this

But, in all likelihood, most tax law changes will be

limited to future transactions.
Secondly, if any tax bill is passed, it is not likely to follow the
Treasury proposals too closely.

To begin with, the President himself has not

yet endorsed the Treasury plan and Secretary Baker is currently reviewing
the decisions of his predecessor.

In fact, a great deal of congressional

opposition to any tax bill is developing.
So long as pressure exists for raising ever-increasing amounts of federal
revenue to contain the deficit, it will be difficult to introduce significant
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improvements in the federal tax system without offsetting them through
undesirable revenue-raising changes.
Finally, the question of reforming the Internal Revenue Code is still in
the stages of proposal and debate.

Thus, the only thing that we can be

absolutely sure of is that the Congress will hold many hearings and government
printers will be cranking out numerous papers to read.
Conclusion
The rush to enact a fundamental change in the federal revenue system in
1985 is misguided.

First of all, in the presence of a $200 billion budget

deficit-- which is likely to linger on through the 1980s -- prudence dictates
that deficit reduction should get top priority.

Focusing attention on tax

reform inevitably means turning away from the more difficult, but far more
urgent, task of reducing the overblown budget.
A cynic might conclude that the current interest in tax reform is a
political smokescreen whereby legislators of both parties can ignore the tough
decisions required to get spending under control.

But even for those who

believe that the tax system is so bad that it needs to be reformed in 1985,
there are many compelling reasons to oppose the package of Treasury Department
staff proposals:
1.

The Treasury proposals would reduce the incentives for new
investment.

2.

These changes would also reduce the venture capital available
for high-tech and other formative enterprises.

3.

They would substantially raise the tax burden on small corporations.

4.· These proposals would create uncertainty among business and private
investors as to the future tax ground rules for new ventures.
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5.

In the aggregate, the Treasury plan would reduce economic growth and
increase the unemployment rate.

6.

These tax changes would weaken the financial position of states and
localities, and of private non-profit institutions.

The best advice that can be given to the Treasury tax reformers who have
been carried away by their enthusiasm is -- back to the drawingboard!

Only

this time, pay more attention to the effects of your proposals on the actual
economy.

